



Value Capture and Transport Infrastructure - Public Policy Issues



AUSTRALIA

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Business School

Centre for Anglied Economic Research

Value Capture and Transport Infrastructure ±Public Policy Issues

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The Profitability of Transport Infrastructure

- 1. Profitability of the new infrastructure (rail line, motorway)
 - Profitability a function of density ±number of passengers.
 - † NB: higher frequency adds to value to commuters
 - Outside of Tokyo and HK, most public transport heavily subsidised
 - ± Australia has a high level of subsidy of public transport due to low density ± increased density reduces subsidy which is a benefit to all taxpayers in the city.

Minimum					



Transport Infrastructure and the Value it Adds

- 1. Transport infrastructure and land values
 - Transport infrastructure is a NET benefit to the residents and businesses in a city
 - <u>±</u> Because <u>in aggregate</u> it lowers land values (rents/prices)
 - **±** For specific areas it increases land values **±**some substantially
 - \$ ODQG WD[ZLOO µFDSWXUH¶ WKDW YDULDWLRQ
- Case of a New Train Station
 - NSW Government investing heavily in new heavy and light rail lines.
 - In vicinity of new stations value of land rises substantially ±it is this windfall SURILW WR ODQGRZQHU WKDW JRYHUQPHQWV VHH
 - ± Rise in value contingent on density allowed (by local government)



Figure 1: Urban Land Rent and Prices and a Decrease in Commuting Costs

Rent, Price Urban

Distance from CBD



Figure 3: Change in Land Prices with a New Station







Figure 4: Change in Land Prices with a New Station and Restricted Rezoning#





Value Capture ±Land Tax


- 1. Land Tax ± W D[RQ Y D O X H R I O D Q G 3 Q D W X U D O O \ ¶ F D S W X U H V Y D O X H X S O L I W Z
 - ‡ Henry Tax Review recommended land tax ±principally in context of replacing stamp duty on transactions
 - **±** A more efficient tax.
 - ‡ Freebairn µ7D[DWLRQ ARustER ROX 4/9Ln@ J3¶ also supports.
 - \ddagger UK Crossrail μ K\SRWKHFDWHV¶ D SRUWLRQ RI EXVLQHVV ODQG WD[WR
- 2. Current Land Tax ±a tiered system which only applies to investor residential and business properties, i.e. exempts owner-occupiers.
 - ‡ Henry Tax Review ±narrow base makes it inefficient
 - ‡ Need to broaden it.
 - ‡ A broad-based land tax would lower price of land ±narrow base means it adds to rents.
- 3. Local Government Rates
 - ‡ In NSW based on value of land ±a form of land tax.
 - **‡** 3



Sydney LGA Rates applied to Residential Property

Sydney LGA Rates applied to Business Property

Rate per unit of land value





Value Capture ±Stamp Duty

- 1. Stamp duty ±as tax on transfer of land ±based on value of property (land + structure) will capture a proportion of value uplift
 - ‡ Like all transaction taxes, a disincentive to transact.
 - ‡ Henry Tax Review, almost every one wants it gone.
 - ‡ However, in the absence of land tax on owner-occupiers ±a second best form of value capture
- 2. ACT Government IS replacing stamp duty with broader land tax.
 - ‡ Unique position as State/LG in one body ±fewer political obstacles.
- 3. History
- ‡ In US and elsewhere, land taxes were more significant in the first half of the 20th century
- ‡ Anti-/DQG 7D[PRYHPHQWV HPHUJHG LQ WKH V«



Value Capture ±Development Contributions

- 1. State Government
 - ‡ On greenfield State Infrastructure Contribution (SIC) applies to developers.
 - ‡ In the case of Parramatta light rail, an SIC of \$200 per of floorspace (equates to \$16-20,000 per dwelling unit) is being mooted ±would be a form of density tax
- 2. Local Government.
 - ‡ LG imposes s94 development contributions on developers.
 - ‡ Also impose voluntary agreements.
 - ‡ Notionally linked to the extra services which new households would require the LG to provide.
- 3. Henry Tax Report
 - ‡ Argued that OK if related to the extra cost which a new development imposed. Otherwise it was a tax.
 - ‡ Development tax ±to extent passed down to landowners, does not lift costs. But, Henry Tax Review did not fully accept this proposition.
 - ‡ At the margin it will restrict development;
- 4. Development Tax vs Quantitative Restrictions on Development
 - ‡ Quantitative restrictions (density controls in inner areas, urban growth boundaries in outer) impose high HTXLYDOHQW 3GHYHORSPHQWHakWeighQosses than OviRh Sares.QW
 - ‡ Relative to these quantitative controls, a development tax would be a better second best option.



Figure 10: A Betterment Tax in Theory






Figure 11: Betterment Tax in Practice






Figure 12: Betterment Tax if Costs Allowed For

