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## Recent changes in international taxation and double tax agreements in Russia

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**1.INTRODUCTION** 

The Russian Federation inherited a confusing and inefficient tax system after the

In the international context, the Russian tax code provides double taxation relief by way of a tax credit for foreign taxes paid formeign sourced income, subject to a limit equivalent to the maximum sum of Russian tax payable on the same income. Any excess foreign tax credits may not be tramete to future or previous periods. Russia is also a party to a number of doubtexation agreements (DTA) with various countries. In general termis is rather unproblematic to petriate capital (particularly dividends, interests and royalties) from Rasto other countries. Similarly, it is relatively simple to invest in the Russian economy through low-tax countries (or tax havens - also referred to as fshore zones' in Russia) and international holding, financial, licensing and service companies and bankingse largest part of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow comes from countries which have favourable tax treaties with Russia. Popular locationos offshore companies utilised when conducting international business with Rasisticlude Cyprus, Holland, Switzerland, Luxembourg and the British Virgin Islandslowever, the Russian government is currently attempting to tighten the take wand in this vein, has been updating international tax law and the existing DTA network.

#### 2. DOUBLE TAX AGREEMENTS

From 1970 until 1991, the USSR develope DTA network including DTAs with India, Finland, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Denmark, Japan, France, the UK, Canada, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Germany, Sweden, Austria and the  $10^{10}$  SHowever, since there were (almost) no cross-border private businesses, the application of these treaties was relatively low. After the Soviet era, Ruasbecame party to a number of DTAs, and has continued to extend its DTA network vigorously since the Fior example, in 1997, Russia had DTAs with 37 countries (including those inherited from the USSR),<sup>12</sup> and by 2010, had increased this number to 777 his includes DTAs with most European countries, Australia, Chithme, USA, Canada, Japan, India, and other countries important economically and politically.

With some deviations, the treaties of the USSR resembled the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (DE) Or United Nations (UN) model tax treaties of the time.<sup>15</sup> The tax treaties to which the former USSR was a party are honoured by Russia, unless the other partitheotreaty has rejected it. The Russian Tax Treaty Model (RTTM) was accepted 1992 and in general follows the OECD model of that time.<sup>16</sup> By and large, with some exchepts, Russian DTAs have been based on the updated OECD model. This appchi corresponds to the general route of the country to join main international componic organisations, including the OECD. It is essential to emphasise that DTAs concluded by Russia with other jurisdictions are an integral part of domestic tax legislation. Russian tax law clearly indicates that if a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Zhidkova E. Y. 2009. Taxes and taxation. Moscow. Eksmo.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Sodnomova S. K. 2008, above n 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Panskov V. G. 2006, above n 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> International Conventions of Russia. Availabl: http://www.taxpravo./zakonodatelstvo/90278-int

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Panskov V. G. 2006, above n 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> International Conventions of Russia, above n 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Sodnomova S. K. 2008, above n 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Resolution of the Government of the Russian deration of 28 May 1992, No. 354, "On Conclusion of

DTA provides other regulations than the law itself, the regulations of the DTA will prevail.<sup>17</sup> Hence, it is of no surprise that tareaties significantly influence Russian domestic tax law and fiscal authorities frequently rely on DTA provisions.

#### 2.1 Residency

The relatively large number of DTAsoncluded has forced the Russian fiscal authorities to embark upon the problems conered out the application of some their provisions. One of the major issues in the ernational taxation context relates to concept of residency. The key criterion of fiscal residency (for corporations) in Russia is the place of incorporation. The notion a Russian/non-Russian tax resident for corporate tax purposes is at present not defined under domestic tax law. Despite the lack of definition, Russian tax law doetsstinguish between domestic and foreign enterprises. Domestic enterprises are the which are established under the laws of Russia and are taxed on their worldwide income. Foreign enterprises controlled and managed in Russia are subject to tax onfits related from business activities carried on through a permanent establishment in thesRam Federation. Despite the fact that Russia is not an OECD member state, defention of permanent establishment under Russian domestic lawbroadly follows the permanent establishment concept provided in the OECD Model Convention. Generalliforeign companies may have certain advantages in conducting business atteris in Russia through a permanent establishment. Contrary to Raussian company, after-tax profit distributions from a permanent establishment to the head office foreign company are not subject to dividend withholding tax<sup>19</sup> Further, currently Russianthin capitalisation rules" apply to resident borrowers only. This makesermanent establishment an attractive form of business structure to enter the Russian market.

When determining profit attribution to pærmanent establishment, the domestic tax code stipulates the indirect profit allocation method as a general rule. However, the majority of Russian DTAs use the **e**bit profit allocation method. 'Force of attraction<sup>20</sup> clauses are present in a small number of tax treaties (with Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, and Vietnam) but lacking in treaties with key investment and trade partners (the US, the UK, CyprEsance, Germany, and the Netherlands). As noted above, international treaties prevaer the domestic law. For that reason, if a permanent establishment of a foreign reprise utilises the direct profit allocation method, it cannot be forced to use the indirect method unless a relevant DTA stipulates the use of the indirect method.

Notwithstanding the Tax Code allowing the placation of the indirect method, the Russian Tax Ministry recommendationstated that the attribution of a foreign enterprise's profits to its Russian perment establishment shall be founded on the relevant principles in DTAs. That is, the permanent establishment's profit is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Russian Tax Code, Article 7. Availabat: http://www.info-law.ru/kodeks/12/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Russian Tax Code, Article 306. Avable at: http://www.info-law.ru/kodeks/12/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Polezharova L., A Permanent Establishment **Mofe**ign Company, Russian Tax Courier, May 2003.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Generally, 'force of attraction clause' implies thouse State may tax the business profits arising to a resident of the other Stably virtue of a PE in theirst state orotherwise.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Order of the Tax Ministry, No. BG-3-23/150, **28** March 2003 "On Approval of the Methodological Recommendations for Tax Authorities on the Application of Certain Provisions of Chapter 25 of the Tax Code of the Russian Federatilicanxation of Foreign Organisations".

considered to be a profit made by a separate and independent enterprise. This resemblance between domestic law and Other D Model illustrates that tax treaties have served as a conduit and influenced development of Russian domestic tax law

As noted above, a number of DTAs counted by the Russian Federation include

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As noted above, the Russian governmeratticempting to update domestic tax law to counteract tax avoidance. Also, more abtise provisions have been included in the more recent Russian tax treaties. Spectivisions can be seen in the Russia-Cyprus DTA, and it is therefore worth discussing this treaty in greater detail.

#### 3.1 Russia-Cyprus DTA

The DTA between Russia and Cyprus was signed in <sup>1</sup>9906 bis DTA was one of the major causes of the massive flow of Russinvestment through the Mediterranean island in the past two decades. Cyprus issate in terms of investments in Russia. At the peak of investment in 2008, Cyprus vestments in Russia reached US\$56.9 billion.<sup>32</sup> This represents more than 20% add foreign investments in Russia. Most of these investments, however, are repatriated Russian capital.

The Cyprus Government was successful united in a favourable offshore tax regime, with nearly 50,000 offshore companies registered in Cyprus since 1975. Nevertheless, in 2004, Cyprus joined the European Union (EU) which signified a reform of their tax regime. Cyprus has the lowest corporate tax in the EU, with resident companies paying ten percent taking is similar to non-resident companies, but income from foreign sources is exempt for non-resident singly, Cyprus exemption on the repatriation of dividentissom foreign subsidiaries of Russian businesses, but excludes Russian subsidiaries founded in countries on the blacklist. Some countries, (for example, Irelanduxembourg and Switzerland), lobbied the Russian government and were excluded from the blacklist bowever, Cyprus continually failed to provide information the Russian tax authorities and thus has stayed on the blacklist.

In April 2009, Russia and Cyprus initiated a revision of double taxation treaty, with the amending protocol to the Russia-Cyprus D<sup>42</sup> SAgned during a visit to Cyprus by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in October 2010. The Russian President suggested that the new protocol wouldwide business transparency and confirmed that Cyprus would be removed from the sizian blacklist. The importance of this DTA for Russia necessitates exploring timeaty amendments to identify its major developments.

### 3.1.1 Amendments to the Russia – Cyprus DTA

The new protocol to the Russia-Cyprus ADTs intimately in line with the latest version of the OECD Model and commentartheereto. Several protocol provisions are especially significant for the developmenthe Russian international tax regime. One of the key developments is that themtépermanent establishment' (Article 5) was further clarified in the protocol to the DTAThe term was extended by including the following supplementary conditions:

- provision of services through an individual, if such individual is present in Russia for more than 183 days during any 12-month period, and income from such services constitutes more than 50% of the Cyprcompany's income from active business activities during the relevant period; or
- provision of services, in respect of one or connected projects, through one or more individuals, for a period exceeding 183yda(in aggregate) during any 12-month period.<sup>44</sup>

The Russian fiscal authorities, like manowher countries, want to increase their revenues. However, instead of increasing the tax base of Russian companies that pay management fees to Cypriot companies, purpose ocol redefines tess earned by Cypriot companies for the provision of management services as Russian sourced income. According to the protocol, a Cypriot company cannot provide management services if they lack the presence of represententiation Russia. Hence, a Cypriot company providing management services and charging the relevant fees to a Russian company is considered to have a representation Russia, and thus having a permanent establishment in Russia. In other wordse, protocol specifies that the provision of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Zhidkova E. Y. 2009, above n 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Protocol to the Agreement betwettine Government of the Russianderation and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus on the Avdaince of Double Taxation with Resput to Taxes on Income and on Capital Available at:

http://www.taxpravo.ruz/akonodatelstvo/statya-90417-

protokol\_k\_soglasheniyu\_mejdu\_pital/stvom\_rossiyskoy\_federaitsi\_pravitelstvom\_respubliki

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

 interest which, in accordance with domestations of the source State, is treated as dividends.

The new amendments imply that incomentronutual funds or similar investment vehicles will be deemed to be dividend with the exception of income from such mutual funds investing only in immovie property as discussed above). This amendment also clarifies the question aswitether interest deemed as dividends under Russian tax law should still qualify as interest under the DTA or whether the treaty should follow the domestic law characterisation lowever, it is not clear whether other Russian DTAs will be ended to overcome the above ambiguity. Further, interest income would continue to enjoy an exemption from withholding tax. However, this exemption does not apply interest which constitutes a constructive dividend under Russian thin capitalisation rule to be the definition of interest has been extended to embrace interest on profitting loans, premiums and prises associated with government securities, bonds and debentures. Nevertheless, penalty charges for late payment are not include the definition of interest and are therefore likely to be considered as 'busies profits' or 'other income'.

A further significant amendment relates t**e ta**xation of gains from the alienation of property (Article 13).<sup>53</sup> Specifically, the rules on the taxation of capital gains were modified in accordance with the OECID odel Tax Convention. According to the protocol, income from the alienation of astes deriving more than 50 precent of their value from Russian real esset as subject to 20 percent Russian withholding tax. However, in the following three casesthere is an exemption from Russian withholding tax:

- alienation of shares in the course of corporate reorganisation;
- alienation of shares listed orrecognised stock exchange; and
- alienation of shares by a pension fuapprovident fund or the government of Cyprus.<sup>54</sup>

A similar provision for the alienation of that exists in the Russian Tax Code. However, that provision does not specify the chanism of paying withholding tax for a non-resident company that is lacking a presence in Russia. Further, the provision does not cover the indirect possession of Russian immovable property through a chain of Russian or Cypriot companies. It alsocludes the alienation of interests in a Cypriot business holding more than 50 queent of immovable property assets in Russia and owned through a branch. As a results the mendment appears to focus on direct

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> This approach was confirmed by Russian arbitratiourt in the cases involving the tax treaties with Germany and the Netherlands. See Decision of the Nodestern Federal District Arbitration Court No. 6-19 78/2006 of 9 April 2007 and Decision of the scow Federal District Arbitration Court No. KA-A 0/6616-0 of 2 July 2005.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Russian Tax Code. Article 269(2). Avabile at: http://www.info-law.ru/kodeks/12/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> According to the previous version of Article 13tbé DTA, income of Cyprus companies from the sale of shares in Russian companies is exempt from Russian tax.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Russian Tax Code. Article 214 (1). Aleatile at: http://www.info-law.ru/kodeks/12/

real estate ownership structures only and is unlikely to affect indirect holdings. These loopholes may be addressed in the future, idenising that this provision will not come into effect until January 1, 2014 at the exert This delay is intended to allow Russia to adjust its current DTAs with other countries.

Other amendments to the Russia-Cyprus DTA that are worthy of discussion include Articles relating to mutual agreement, change of information, and reciprocal assistance. According to Article 4 of the thesident status of a company is to be defined by its place of management (the residency criterion in Cyprus) or place of registration (the tax residency criterion in Russia)Thus, if the company is a tax resident of both States, the place of effective manageisnentey factor to determine residency. The protocol has introduced a mutual agreement procedure (Artifice 25) the case that the place of effective management cannot be determine/mine/edvever, it appears that the protocol wording doesspectify the mutual agreement procedure for a situation where one state questions whether the place of effective management was the other state. The introduction of a maltagreement procedure is still a positive development, as taxpayers are now allowed to present their case to the fiscal authority of either State within thregears if they believe that a state is in breach of the <sup>58</sup>/<sub>D</sub>TA. The previous version of the DTA permittedtaxpayer to apply only to the fiscal authority of the state where he was a resident.

Another key provision of the DTA is the exchange of information article (Article 26).<sup>59</sup> Article 26 uses the identical words as the OECD Model Tax Convention. Similar amendments were also introduce Russia's DTAs with the Czech Republic and Germany (in effect from 1 January  $20^{60}$ ).

Specifically, the adjustments to the pission on exchange of information are:

- information exchanges are no longeritied to taxes covered by the DTA;
- information requests are permitted whether is 'necessary for carrying out the provisions of the agreement', and also where it is 'foreseeably relevant' for the 'administration and enfocement of domestic laws';
- information requests would need to processed, even where the requested information is held by a bank, nominee or a person acting in an agency or fiduciary capacity or relates to the inditive of the owners of the company.

The revised provision broadens the scope of information that can be requested. In particular, either State may request **infa**tion concerning taxes not only covered by the DTA (as provided in the previous DTA) also information concerning domestic taxes. A state is obligated to provide **imfa**tion even though it 'may not need such information for its own tax purpose<sup>62</sup>. These amendments demonstrate the increasing

 $<sup>^{56}</sup>_{--}$  Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42.

<sup>60</sup> These DTAs are available at: http://www.taxpravo.ru/zkonodatelstvo/90278-int

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Protocol to the Russia-Cyprus DTA, above n 42.

attention of the Russian fiscal authorities to the factual substance of Cypriot companies. Some commentators suggesset the basis for this exchange of information was the newly revised legissen of Cyprus, including the law 'On the Assessment and Collection of Taxes The new Article 26 also provides that both States should follow procedures of collecting information in accordance with their domestic laws. According to the Cypribaw the Director of the Inland Revenue should provide information to the other Statenly if foreign fiscal authorities have provided extensive details about the taxpageong with the justification for the request of information<sup>64</sup>. This clause exists to previt foreign fiscal authorities from engaging in 'fishing expeditions' lacking yagenuine evidence against the concerned taxpayer.<sup>65</sup> In relation to Russia, it is not clear how the exchange of tax information with other jurisdictions will be performed ipractice since, at present, there are no appropriate arrangements in the Russian tax authorities' systems.

A further appealing aspect of the new RassCyprus DTA is the development of the institution of reciprocal assistance in tax collection (Article  ${}^{67}_{27}$ )The scope of assistance in the collection of taxes will betended to allow tax authorities to verify the legitimacy and amount of the tax requirements of one State in the courts and administrative bodies of another State. The request for assistance in collection however, may be refused on various grounds - for example, if the requested measures are contrary to the domestic laws of a State new version of Article 27 enters into force as soon as the appropriate legahdation is implemented by Cyprus.

Interestingly, Article 29 is not meant toppaly to resident individuals. Rather, this provision appears to target corporate testidents of Cyprus that were incorporated elsewhere and afterward acquired tax restigien Cyprus by moving their place of management and control. In this contexis tworth noting that there is Russian case law dealing with non-Cypriot incorporate desidents that have effectively claimed benefits under the DTÅ. These structures are considerted be offensive by the Russian fiscal authorities and consequently logical that this provision target identical arrangements.

It is also worth noting that a probable rejection of DTA benefits can only arise as a result of mutual agreement between Ruassid Cyprus about the offensive character of the exploitation of tax residence inethcase in question. This approach differs considerably from the approach taken other Russian DTAs. For instance, the Russia–US DTA provides certain criteria foe tavailability of treaty benefits and the taxpayers can only apply to the fiscal authorities to confirm that these criteria are applicable in their particular cases dationally, Article 29 does not specify the applicability of the DTA where the fiscal taxorities of Cyprus and Russia disagree in a certain case. A taxpayer may be deprived from the DTA benefits only if the fiscal authorities of both countries regard the taxorities case to be offensive. Consequently, neither DTA party may invoke this provisi unilaterally, which critically limits the application of Article 29.

#### 4.0CONCLUSION

Russian international tax law may be charaissed as rather fractional and curtailed. However, the Russian tax system is in phrocess of reform, and recent updates in the rules related to tax avoidance as wellpassvisions preventing misuse of tax treaties represent a positive advancement. Unfortunately, the proposed draft regulation integrating the beneficial ownershipconcept into Russian tax law is not comprehensive enough to coval the related issues. The proposed amendments will of provide lated evides integration of the lated issues. The proposed amendments will of provide lated evides integration of the lated issues. The proposed amendments will of a voidance in the international arena. found under the DTAs provisions. This magve a profitable impact on tax revenues. Notwithstanding initial concerns caused the amendments to the Russia Cyprus DTA, it remains one of the most benedic Russian DTAs. On the other hand, the amendments clearly indicate that the Ranstax authorities are starting to focus on the actual business rationale behind Cypriot structures. In this sense, the protocol provides Russian fiscal authorities with wneinstruments to confront tax-driven business structures.